The Tran Organization

Just a bits and bobs about out ther on this crew


FBI deatails with list of casino's hit etc..

http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-releases/2011/sd011411.htm


What Really Happened: An Inside Look at the Tran False Shuffle Scam according to Doug Addler has 16 years experience in casino surveillance management.

http://www.casinoenterprisemanagement.co......fle-scam

American Greed

http://207.46.150.45/id/45555902

Casino-ology
The First Cut is the Deepest
(02/02/2011) Bill Zender

http://www.worldgameprotection.com/the-c......Deepest/




And this, which is from World Game Propection Conference, and out there on PDF but I don't know how to link it:

“The False Shuffle Takedown”
Timothy D. Bohr
Surveillance Director
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation
Foxwoods Resort Casino
Mashantucket, Connecticut
As most of you are aware with the recent media coverage, a grand jury in San Diego indicted 19
individuals of the Tran Organization on racketeering, money laundering and conspiracy charges related to
the False Shuffle scam that I spoke about at the 2006 World Game Protection Conference. To say this is
long overdue is a great understatement, but to see these individuals finally brought to justice is refreshing.
We heard various rumors of the existence of this group dating back to 2002, but with little information
sharing across the Surveillance Casino Industry, the full scope of their existence never really became an
alarm for most Surveillance Departments. The 70 page indictment lists 18 casinos throughout the US and
Canada as victims, but I know there are others that either did not have the recorded evidence to prove
themselves as victims, or did not want to admit that they were hit and suffered substantial loses. Either way,
we know that the 18 listed were not the only casinos affected by the Tran Organization.
The Tran Organization worked several different angles to become one of the most successful groups to
defraud casinos out of millions of dollars, using bribes to get casino employees to execute false shuffles on
Blackjack and Mini-Baccarat games, as well as utilizing these employees to join their organization and
train others in the technique of false Shuffles. The Organization also used hidden transmitter devices with
specially developed software that could predict the order in which cards would reappear during these
games.
During my presentation at the 2006 World Game Protection Conference, I spoke as freely as I felt I could
regarding the scam, as I knew they were still traveling the US and Canada and were still a major risk to
other casinos, but at the same time knew the investigation was well under way. Unfortunately several
casinos were still victims in 2006, but hopefully some others were not due to the increased warnings being
shared throughout the Surveillance community.
Our first contact with the Tran Organization was in January of 2005, where they recruited and bribed one of
our dealers with $500.00. This dealer was shown how the false shuffle worked and was instructed to
practice his techniques for use at our casino at a later date. In March of 2005, another dealer hit our radar
screen after we discovered he had performed a false shuffle creating a slug of approximately 68 cards that
resulted in the Organization taking $91,100 from us. (He ultimately went on to work with the Tran
Organization as a Trainer after he was terminated here, and is included in the indictment.) Over the next
week or so, we observed several large wins on Blackjack tables that raised our suspicion of legitimate wins.
Working around the clock, the false shuffles were uncovered by the diligent work of one of our
Surveillance Investigators working closely with one of our Surveillance Shift Managers to determine how
these wins were occurring. The slugs were identified and by backtracking we were able to detail every
move of the group while on our floors and the means in which they operated. You have to remember that
we are a large casino and wins of $100,000 or more are not uncommon and can occur frequently. However,
these wins were different and put our Surveillance expertise in the spotlight and also under the microscope
of our Casino and Tribal Management. Either we found what was happening, or these wins would go
unsolved and the perpetrators would walk away freely.
Once we had determined the means of the scam, we then were able to diligently put together a detailed
video timeline of all incidents and utilize our state of the art digital system to document the scam in it’s
entirety while they we on site at our Casino. We identified the Organizations participants as well as our
table games personnel involved, and turned the complete package over to the proper State and Federal
agencies who had been working closely with us on these suspicions. If we hadn’t reacted in a quick and
deliberate manner, this scam could have continued for an indefinite time frame resulting in losses that
would have reached unprecedented levels. To say I was very proud of our entire Surveillance Department
and the Herculean efforts they displayed would be an understatement. They utilized their years of training
and experience to quickly discover an abnormality and then to run with their suspicions and quickly
uncover the means in which these abnormalities were utilized to defraud our casino.
The indictment lists numerous items for forfeiture that were in the possession of the Organization. These
include $3,351,781, several properties, bank accounts, vehicles and a Rolex Watch. This represents only a
portion of what I believe was actually perpetrated by this group over the years, and with other casinos
either without the video documentation needed, or unwilling to divulge they were victims, or some that are
probably unaware they were even hit, this forfeiture list will only scratch the surface. However, the main
accomplishment is that this group has been caught red handed and has taken a serious blow to its
operations. Like any successful group of this nature, someone will continue to run with it even after this
initial group is disbanded or depleted. It was far too successful to naively think that someone else has not
prepared to step in and reap the benefits of a scam that worked so successfully for so long. It may not be a
direct copycat group, but one that will learn from the mistakes of this group and refine their skills to
defraud casinos going forward. It is now our job to identify the next scam and bring its ring of thieves to
justice. I guess you can call it job security.
Many casinos instituted various methods to counteract the scam. Some changed their shuffle procedures,
others relied on automatic shufflers, and some made sweeping changes to their overall procedures. It
certainly is not for me to say what could or would work best, and each casino must determine at what price
their changes will cost in both time and equipment. They changes we made were based on what we felt
worked best for us, and what would have the most impact with the least amount of disruption to the games.
This along with technology was our answer to this operation at the time. Will we need to continually adjust
our thinking and proactive moves going forward, absolutely. They have, and we need to keep up with them.
Our early counteractions may not be the best current solution, and if we sit still thinking we have solved the
problem, then we are the problem and not the solution. Talking about situations, suspicious activity and
sharing information with your peers within the Surveillance industry will always be the best means of
heading off serious incidents before the become an epidemic.
I wish all of you the best. Enjoy The Game.
Overview of the scheme (Source: Indictment) (Source: The San Diego Union-Tribune)
May 25, 2007
The indictment states that two games were used in the scheme:
Mini-baccarat: A casino game usually played with six to eight full decks. With up to nine
players seated at the table, two hands are dealt and players bet on which hand will win, based on
points assigned to each card value. Players can also bet both hands will be tied.
Blackjack: A casino game usually played with one to six full decks. Each player tries to best the
dealer's hand without going over 21. Each player's hand is measured against the dealer's and the
one closest to 21 wins. If the dealer's hand exceeds 21, all players who remain in the game win
their bet.
Other terms
Shoe: A rectangular box that is designed to hold several decks of cards, with a slot in the front
that allows a dealer to quickly draw one card at a time for dealing.
False shuffle: The act in which a dealer pretends to shuffle the cards but actually keeps them in
the same order.
Slug: A group of cards in the same order they had been dealt in the previous game.
Indicator cards: A card, or series of cards, that signals the beginning of a slug.
Pit boss: A floor supervisor who oversees several tables of gaming.
Card recorder: A person in the scheme who records the order of the cards in the previous game.
This recorder either makes notes on paper (in mini-baccarat) or relays the information to another
associate who enters it into a computer loaded with card-tracking software (in blackjack).
How the scheme worked
According to the indictment, here are the steps the Tran Organization used to commit the crimes:
Four members of the organization developed the scheme and recruited and trained others to
participate.
Once in the casino, the card recorder would track the order of the cards played in the game.
Previously bribed dealers would perform a false shuffle with the decks and return the cards to the
shoe, thereby creating the slug. Pit bosses were sometimes bribed to look the other way.
Once the slug was identified, the card recorder would signal, either by hand or through the use of
electronic earpieces, the other members of the group to increase the size of their bets on the
predicted winning hands. l Players could win significant amounts of money in short periods of
time. According to the indictment, in one 90-minute session, the Tran Organization took in about
$868,000.
The organization would distribute large chip winnings among several members to avoid the
federally mandated reporting limit (above $10,000).
Indicted:
Phuong Quoc Truong
aka “Pai Gow” John
aka John Truong
Van Thu Tran
Tai Khiem Tran
Anh Phuong Tran
Phat Ngoc Tran
Martin Lee Aronson
aka Martin Smith
Liem Thanh Lam
George Michael Lee
Tien Duc Vu
Song Hong Johnson
Barry Wellford
Nam Van To
aka “Tommy”
Khai Hong Tran
John Tran
Willy Tran
aka “Duy”
Tuan Mong Le
Duc Cong Nguyen
Han Truong Nguyen
Ha Thuy Giang
aka Thuy Ha Giang

And so on

Surveillance video shows elaborate casino cheating scam

http://blog.angryasianman.com/2011/11/su......ate.html

The true story of how the Tran team BJ and Baccarat scam, (which bilked casinos for millions), was detected and subsequently prosecuted has never been reported until now on this BB.

Authorities were completely fooled and never would have detected the scam except for this:

Certain members of the team were informed by posts on the Magic Café that all real hustlers have to “prove” themselves and get their official approval by demonstrating their moves and scam on YouTube. So they made YouTube videos of how they did it.

Someone who cleaned the toilets at Nevada Gaming saw the YouTube video of how the Tram scam operated and informed his supervisor, the head toilet cleaner, who subsequently showed the YouTube video to Nevada Gaming Control. At that point, all the half-smarts, surveillance people and protection experts jumped on the band wagon and began falling all over themselves to be the first to report that they knew the scam all along. It was “old hat” to them or so they said. Of course, the YouTube video was subsequently removed and used as evidence against the team.

Although I cannot vouch one hundred percent for the veracity of the above report, the toilet cleaner’s third cousin’s sister posted on YouTube that this report is true and correct to the best of her understanding, knowledge and belief. Since her statement was on YouTube, no one could possibly doubt her sincerity or truthfulness.

The moral of the story is, all “real” active hustlers demonstrate their moves on YouTube to get the approval and admiration of the DVD crowd and to “prove” they are really hustlers.

LOL !

I worked with some of the people at casino Rama, but none of the ones mentioned above... Although if you mix and match the names above, their names can be made...

I'm surprised Mr Hop Lo isn't on the list.